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This paper provides new estimates of the effects of ethnic networks on U.S. exports.  In line with 
recent research, our dataset is a panel of exports from U.S. states to 29 foreign countries.  Our 
analysis departs from the literature in two ways, both of which show that previous estimates of 
the ethnic-network elasticity of trade are sensitive to the restrictions imposed on the estimated 
models.  Our first departure is to control for unobserved heterogeneity with properly specified 
fixed effects, which we can do because our dataset contains a time dimension absent from 
previous studies.  Our second departure is to remove the restriction that the network effect is the 
same for all ethnicities.  We find that ethnic-network effects are much larger than has been 
estimated previously, although they are important only for a subset of countries.   
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  Information is essential for identifying advantageous exchange possibilities.  In addition 
to information, confidence or trust that the parties involved in an exchange will perform 
according to their commitments is crucial before transactions are agreed upon.  A lack of 
information and a lack of trust are frequently identified as informal barriers to trade.  These 
informal barriers to trade likely deter international trade to a larger extent than domestic trade 
and, therefore, contribute to explaining why, even after adjusting for economic size and distance, 
intra-national trade flows tend to swamp international trade flows.
1
Prior research, theoretical as well as empirical, has identified immigrant networks as an 
important intermediary that can mitigate these informal barriers in home-country markets by 
providing information about demand, languages, business practices, and laws, as well as 
instilling confidence to facilitate international trade.  By reducing the cost of searching across 
national borders and by serving as a means of enforcing contracts, immigrants increase the 
likelihood of a match between a buyer and a seller that results in a completed transaction.  Our 
focus is on how immigrant networks have affected US exports at the level of individual states. 
  Our analysis departs from the existing literature in two ways.  First, we allow for 
unobserved fixed effects when estimating our gravity model.  As Cheng and Wall (2005) have 
demonstrated, gravity models that do not allow for fixed effects tend to provide biased estimates 
because such models fail to account for unobserved time-invariant factors that affect the level of 
trade and the independent variables used to explain the level of trade.  Second, we allow for the 
immigrant network effects to vary across ethnic groups.  For various reasons, the export-
immigrant network relationship is likely to differ across countries.  For example, as stressed by 
                                                 
1 See McCallum (1995) for the seminal article exploring the impact of national borders.  Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001) 
argue that even small differences in transactions costs can account for large border effects. 
  1Dunlevy (2006) the trade-stimulating effects of immigrants should tend to be greater when the 
host and source countries differ more in terms of institutions, languages, and cultures.  Here is 
when the special skills associated with ethnic networks can provide essential information and 
contract-enforcement services. 
  To set the stage for our analysis, we review the existing literature in the next section.  
Next, we lay out the most general specification of ethnic networks in a common gravity model.  
This general version allows us to show very easily the different types of models that have been 
estimated, as well as our departures.  To highlight the importance of our departures, we show 
results following the existing literature as well.  We use the common gravity model to generate 
pooled cross section estimates and fixed-effect estimates when the network effect is assumed to 
be the same for all ethnicities.  We then remove this restriction on the network effect and allow 
for country-specific network effects.  Finally, we provide our most general estimates: country-
specific gravity models with country-specific network effects. 
 
2. Literature 
The traditional focus of research exploring the connection between immigration and 
international trade has been on how immigration affected factor supplies in the source and 
recipient countries.  The change in factor supplies affects production and, ultimately, trade 
flows.
2  Recently, most notably due to the research of James Rauch and various co-authors, 
attention has been drawn to the network effects associated with immigrants.
3  Immigrant 
networks are thought to lower the transactions costs of international trade by providing 
                                                 
2 In the Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek framework, the movement of goods can be viewed as a movement of factor 
services.  In a two-factor world, the exports of a capital-abundant country tend to contain larger amounts of capital 
services relative to labor services than its imports.  Thus, the country is exporting capital services and importing 
labor services. 
3 See Rauch (2001) for a wide-ranging review of the literature. 
  2information about trade possibilities and by aiding the enforcement of contracts.
4  Beginning 
with work by Gould (1994), a number of empirical papers have attempted to identify and 
quantify this complementary link. 
Table 1 contains a summary of the key empirical papers that have examined the impact of 
immigrant networks on international trade.  In this section, we focus on the results for a subset of 
these studies, leaving the discussion of econometric methods used in these studies to subsequent 
sections.  Nearly all of the studies have focused on the trade flows of English-speaking countries.  
The major exception is a study by Rauch and Trindade (2002) that focuses on the impact of 
ethnic Chinese networks. 
Because of our use of state exports, we restrict our discussion of existing studies to those 
that also use state exports.  Many of the recent studies of US trade have used exports at the state 
level to examine the immigrant-export connection.
5  Such a focus is potentially important 
because the immigrant-export connection depends on networks of individuals and families in 
which proximity is likely to play a role.  The use of state-level data allows for the use of proxies 
that are closer to what is suggested by economic theory.  The underlying theory suggests that an 
increase in the number of immigrants from a specific country into a specific state increases the 
source country information in the state.  The increased information effectively reduces 
transaction costs, which stimulates exports from the state to the country.  As Dunlevy (2004) has 
argued, if the effect of immigrants cannot be found at the state level, then doubt is cast on the 
results based on national data.
6
                                                 
4 On the import side, immigrants may affect trade by purchasing goods produced in their home countries. 
5 The reason that these studies examine only exports is that state-level import data do not exist. 
6 Dunlevy (2004) also points out that this use of disaggregated data entails some assumptions that might not hold.  
For example, immigrants located in a specific state are assumed to affect exports from that state only.  It is possible, 
however that these immigrants might affect exports from other states (Herander and Saavedra, 2005). 
  3Four recent studies — Co et al. (2004), Bardhan and Guhathakurta (2005), Herander and 
Saavedra (2005), and Dunlevy (2006) — have used state-level export data.  The data in these 
studies cover the early to mid 1990s.  Each examines the basic issue of the impact of immigrants 
on exports; however, they extend the basic literature in different ways.  All are based on a 
gravity model, specifically a pooled cross-section model. 
Co et al. (2004) examine state exports for 1993 using 48 states.  They use 28 export 
destinations, 14 of which overlap with the destinations that we use.  Export destinations are split 
into developed and developing countries.  Separate network elasticities are estimated for the two 
sets of countries.  These average elasticities are quite close, with an estimate of 0.29 for the 
ethnic-network elasticities of exports to developed countries and 0.27 for exports to developing 
countries. 
Bardhan and Guhathakurta (2004) compare exports from the states on the east coast with 
those on the west coast using data for 1994-1996.  The effects of two networks — one business 
network and one sociocultural — are explored.  A statistically significant finding is that 
transnational business ties increase exports from both coasts.  Meanwhile, a statistically 
significant relationship for immigrant networks is found only for west coast states.  The ethnic-
network elasticity of exports ranges from 0.24-0.26 for west coast states and 0.06-0.09 for east 
coast states. 
Using state exports to 36 countries for 1993-1996, Herander and Saavedra (2005) 
examine the relationship between state exports and in-state and out-of-state immigrants.  First, 
they examine the standard link between a state’s immigrant population and its exports to the 
home country and find an ethnic-network elasticity of 0.18.  Second, they argue that because a 
state’s exporters have access to the ethnic networks of other states, the number of immigrants 
  4from the destination market in the rest of the states should also matter.  As they expected, they 
found that there was a positive link between a state’s exports to a country and the number of 
immigrants from that country in the rest of the United States.   
The final study relying on state exports to study the link between exports and immigrants 
is by Dunlevy (2006).  Using average exports to 87 countries for 1990-1992, Dunlevy estimates 
various specifications and finds a range for the ethnic-network elasticity of exports from 0.24-
0.47.  Dunlevy also examines a number of corollaries associated with the basic proposition of a 
link between exports and immigrants.  He finds immigrant networks are especially useful for 
exports to countries with more corruption and to those with a less similar language, while 
institutional differences were not found to affect exports. 
 
3. A Common Gravity Model 
  We estimate the effect of ethnic networks on state-level exports using a gravity model, as 
does most of the existing literature.  In gravity models, the volume of trade between two partners 
is a function of the sizes of the partners [gross domestic product (GDP) or its regional equivalent, 
such as gross state product (GSP), and population] and the distance between them.  Additionally, 
gravity models control for cross-country differences in trade policy, usually by including dummy 
variables to indicate membership in preferential trading areas.  For our first three sets of 
estimations, we use a gravity model that is common to all countries and states in the sense that 
the coefficients on the traditional gravity variables are assumed to be the same across all 
state/country pairs.  The common gravity model (expressed in natural logs) with our most 
general specification of ethnic networks is: 
. ln ln ln ln ln t
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ij F Contig Dist N N Y Y x ε + θ + η + δ + γ + β + τ + α =             (1) 
  5In (1), i denotes a state, j denotes a country, and t denotes time.  The dependent variable is , 
exports from state i to country j in year t.  The gravity variables in (1) control for size and 







t is the population of state i, Nj
t is 
the population of country j, Distij is the distance between i and j, and Contigij is a dummy 
variable which takes the value of 1 if i and j are contiguous and zero otherwise.
7
  In addition to the gravity variables, equation (1) includes a time dummy   that controls 
for changes in the trade policy of country j, including its levels of import tariffs and whether or 
not it has a preferential trading agreement with the United States.  By allowing for time dummies 
to differ across countries, we are freed from having to quantify the trade stance of the countries, 
which is notoriously difficult. 
t
j τ
  Our first main departure from the literature is that we allow for properly specified fixed 
effects, which are denoted in (1) by αij.
8  As Cheng and Wall (2005) demonstrate, gravity models 
that do not allow for fixed effects tend to provide biased estimates because they fail to account 
for unobserved time-invariant factors that affect the level of trade as well as the independent 
variables that are used to explain the level of trade.  Nonetheless, in common with the existing 
ethnic-network literature, we first estimate equation (1) without fixed effects. 
  The variable of most interest presently is  , our proxy for the extent of ethnic networks, 
which is the number of residents of state i who were born in country j.  Its coefficient, θ
t
ij F
j, is the 
ethnic-network elasticity of exports to country j.  With the qualified exceptions of Rauch and 
                                                 
7 As shown by Boisso and Ferrantino (1997), an equivalent specification replaces population with per capita gross 
domestic (state) product. 
8 There is somewhat of a semantic issue regarding what is and what isn’t a model with fixed effects.  According to 
the standard references (Greene, 2003; Hsiao, 1986), fixed-effects models allow for intercepts to differ across cross-
sectional units, which, in the case of trade, are trading pairs.  Wagner, Head, and Ries (2002) include country 
dummies, while Dunlevy (2006) includes country and state dummies.  Although a model with such dummies allows 
for some variation in intercepts, it does so in a highly restricted fashion and is not a fixed-effects model as described 
by Hsiao and Greene. 
  6Trindade (2002), Girma and Yu (2002), and Dunlevy (2006), every paper in the literature that 
has estimated the relationship has assumed that the ethnic-network elasticity is the same across 
countries.
9  In this sense, our second main departure from the literature is to allow for θj to differ 
across countries so as to identify differences in network effects across ethnic groups.  It is 
reasonable to expect that the network effect associated with Irish immigrants to differ from that 
of Thai immigrants.  Such a departure allows us to test whether the network effects, in fact, differ 
across ethnic groups.  As we demonstrate later, the ethnic network effect found in existing 
studies is driven by a small number of countries. 
  Our dataset is limited by the availability of state-level data on the number of foreign-born 
residents, which is available from the decennial census and is sufficiently detailed only for 1990 
and 2000.  Nonetheless, this gives us two years of observations, which allows us to create a panel 
and to control for fixed effects.  To smooth out our data, our trade, income, and population 
variables are two-year averages for 1989-1990 and 1999-2000.  Distance is measured by the 
great-circle distance between largest cities.  Our dataset begins with all nonzero exports from the 
50 states plus the District of Columbia to 29 countries.
10  After applying the multivariate outlier 
test of Hadi (1994), which identifies 13 observations as outliers, we have 2,912 (out of a 
maximum of 2,958) observations of trade between 1,456 state/country trading pairs.
11
                                                 
9 Rauch and Trindade (2002) assume that the effect is zero for all but ethnic Chinese residents; Girma and Yu (2002) 
assume that for U.K. trade the effect is zero for all but members of the British Commonwealth; and Dunlevy (2006) 
uses interaction terms to allow the ethnic-network elasticity to vary across countries because of language, 
corruption, and institutional differences. 
10 Our export data are from the Massachusetts Institute for Social and Economic Research (MISER).  Our data are 
merchandise export shipments by state of origin of movement to various destinations throughout the world.  
Although this data is regarded as the best available for state exports, it has well-known weaknesses—the most 
important of which arise from the differences between the origin of movement and the origin of production.  See 
Cronovich and Gazel (1999) and Coughlin and Mandelbaum (1991).  
11 For the outlier test we used the changes in the logs of: real exports, our income and population variables, and the 
number of foreign born residents.  Because we use the changes over time, we can ignore the time-invariant variables 
in (1). 
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4. Pooled Cross Section vs. Fixed-Effect Estimates 
  As mentioned above, because of data limitations, existing estimates of the effect of ethnic 
networks on trade were limited to using the pooled cross section version of the gravity model.  
The most general of these allows for state and country effects (Dunlevy, 2006).  This model can 
be obtained from equation (1) by assuming that each state/country fixed effect is the sum of a 
common intercept (α), a state dummy variable ( i λ ), and a country dummy variable ( ).  
Although this allows for different intercepts across trading pairs, it does so by applying a 
complicated set of ad hoc restrictions on the trading-pair intercepts (Cheng and Wall, 2005).  
j ω
  For the time being, also assume that the network effect is the same for all ethnicities 
( ).  Our pooled cross section regression equation is then  θ = θ j















ij F Contig Dist N N Y Y x ε + θ + η + δ + γ + β + τ + ω + λ + α =     (2) 
The results in Table 2 are from our estimation of equation (2) with and without the restriction 
that the effect of ethnic networks on trade is zero.  The first set of results corresponds to a fairly 
typical gravity model that controls for changes in trade policy, the sizes of the trading partners, 
distance, and contiguity, but not for the effect of ethnic networks.
12  The results are quite 
standard: trade is positively related to both measures of size, negatively related to distance, and is 
higher for contiguous trading partners.  The coefficients on all of our gravity variables are 
statistically significant.
13
                                                 
12 All our equations are estimated by least squares.  The existence of zero values for either the dependent variable or 
the independent variables raises problems for the estimation of a double log functional form.  Recall, however, that 
our sample was chosen so that the level of exports was non-zero.  To handle situations in which a state’s immigrant 
population was zero, we simply added one to the level of the immigrant population.  Because there are only four 
such observations, each with a different state and destination country, the alternative of eliminating the observations 
should have little effect on the results. 
13 Note that, throughout this paper, we use significance at the 10% level to indicate “statistical significance.” 
  8  The second set of results in Table 2 is analogous to those in the existing literature that 
have estimated the effects of ethnic networks:  It does not impose the restriction that the ethnic-
network effect is zero, although it does restrict the effect to be the same across ethnicities.  From 
the table it is clear that inclusion of the number of foreign born affects the results in two ways.  
First, the estimated ethnic-network elasticity is positive, statistically significant, and within the 
typical range in the literature:  A 10% increase in the number of residents born in a foreign 
country will increase state exports to that country by 2.7%.  Second, inclusion of the foreign-
born variable has a statistically significant effect on the rest of the model.
14  For example, the 
estimates of δ and η change a great deal when Fij is included, suggesting that, because distance 
and contiguity are correlated with the number of foreign born.  The general implication of this 
result is that gravity models that do not account for the effects of ethnic networks are providing 
biased estimates of the influence of other variables on trade volume.  In other words, the point 
estimates in the second column are preferred statistically to those in the first column. 
  Despite the apparent reasonableness of the preceding results from the pooled cross-
section estimation, there are serious doubts about their validity.  These doubts are based on the 
fact that this version of the gravity model does not account properly for unobserved (or not 
included) heterogeneity between state/country trading pairs that might account simultaneously 
for the level of exports from state i to country j as well as the number of residents in i that were 
born in j.  Gravity models that do not account properly for these fixed effects have been shown to 
generate seriously biased estimates (Cheng and Wall, 2005), even when exporter and importer 
effects are included, as in our estimation of equation (2). 
                                                 
14 A likelihood-ratio test rejects the null hypothesis that the restriction that θ = 0 does not have a statistically 
significant effect on the estimation.  The value of the test statistic, 98.1 (twice the difference in the absolute values 
of the log-likelihood functions) exceeds its corresponding critical value, which is χ
2(1) = 3.84 at the 5-percent level. 
  9  The presence of estimation bias is confirmed by Figure 1.  In the figure, the residuals of 
the second estimation of equation (2) are plotted across the state/country pairs, with the pairs 
arranged in ascending order of their average residuals.  Unbiased estimation would yield an 
average residual of zero for each state/country pair.  Instead, there is a clear pattern of 
overestimating trade for some pairs and underestimating it for others.  In fact, for about two-
thirds of the trading pairs the residual has the same sign for both observations.    
  We address the problem of bias by allowing each state/country pair to have its own 
unrestricted intercept.  Note that doing so means that it is not possible to estimate the effects of 
distance and contiguity separately from the intercept.  Specifically, the new intercept, which 
encompasses all variables that are fixed over time but which differ across state/country pairs, 
becomes  .  Because the effects of distance and contiguity are 
not of interest presently, however, this does not pose a problem.
ij ij ij ij Contig Dist η + δ + α = σ ln
15  Our fixed-effects regression 
equation is 















ij F N N Y Y x ε + θ + γ + β + τ + σ =        (3) 
We estimate (3) under the assumption that the ethnic-network effects are the same for all 
countries.  The results of our estimations are summarized in Table 3.  Note that the two earlier 
estimations of equation (2) summarized in Table 2 are restricted versions of those summarized in 
Table 3. 
  Our estimation of equation (3) is the fixed-effects version of the standard estimation in 
the ethnic-networks literature, which includes the ethnic-network variable and assumes that the 
                                                 
15 By subsuming distance and contiguity in this way we are not eliminating them from our estimation.  In fact, 
because we do not have to use any of the many flawed measures of distance, we would argue that we are controlling 
for them more accurately than when we estimated equation (2).  A similar argument holds for contiguity in that we 
do not need to assume that all contiguity is the same regardless of the length of border, the terrain along the border, 
etc.   
  10ethnic-network elasticity is the same across countries.  Our estimated ethnic-network elasticity is 
0.142, which is statistically significant.  Note also that the inclusion of fixed effects reduces the 
estimated ethnic-network elasticity and, because the fixed-effects version of the model is 
preferred statistically to the corresponding pooled cross section version, the lower estimate is the 
preferred one.
16  This result suggests that previous studies provided biased estimates of the 
ethnic-network elasticity of US exports, tending to overstate the effect of such networks on trade.   
 
5. Heterogeneous Ethnic-Network Effects 
  Having established that estimation of the ethnic-network elasticity of trade requires the 
proper controls for trading-pair fixed effects, we can move on to our second point that the effects 
of ethnic networks can differ dramatically across ethnicities.  Although, previously, this has not 
received explicit attention empirically, the possibility that ethnic-network elasticities can differ 
across countries follows from the extant literature.  Dunlevy (2006), for example, stressed how 
ethnic networks should be more important when the source and destination countries differ in 
their institutions, languages, and cultures.   
  In addition to the cultural and institutional attributes of the trading partners, Rauch (1999) 
has stressed how the importance of ethnic networks might depend on the degree of product 
differentiation.  That is, trust and/or marketing might be more important for more-differentiated 
goods, and countries can differ in the extent to which they trade in highly differentiated products.  
Gould (1994), Dunlevy and Hutchinson (1999), and Rauch and Trindade (2002) find support for 
this, although Dunlevy (2004) does not.   
                                                 
16 A likelihood-ratio test rejects the null hypothesis that the restriction the pair-specific intercepts are the same does 
not have a statistically significant effect on the estimation.  The value of the test statistic, 3769.97, indicates this at 
better than the 5-percent level. 
  11  A final motivation for allowing for heterogeneous ethnic-network effects comes from 
Greaney (2005), who finds that foreign affiliates are much more likely to trade with their home 
countries than with other countries.  Because this tendency was heterogeneous across countries, 
differences in the levels and types of foreign direct investment might lead to differences in 
ethnic-network effects if foreign affiliates are relatively more likely to export back to their home 
markets. 
  To account for the possibility of country-specific ethnic-network effects, we estimate the 
following gravity model, which differs from (3) only in that it relaxes the restriction that  θ = θ j :  















ij F N N Y Y x ε + θ + γ + β + τ + σ =
  The results of this estimation are summarized in Table 4, in which the heterogeneity of 
the ethnic-network elasticities is apparent.  Further, the use of a likelihood-ratio test leads to the 
rejection of the null hypothesis that the restriction that these elasticities are the same.  These 
statistically most-preferred estimates suggest that ethnic networks are important for only five 
countries, and that the effects are much larger than has been estimated previously.  The five 
countries whose estimated ethnic-network elasticity is statistically different from zero are Brazil, 
Colombia, Spain, Thailand, and Turkey.  In terms of institutions, language, and culture, these 
countries appear to have very little in common with each other, so it is not immediately apparent 
how our results can be explained by these differences.  Perhaps, therefore, the degree of product 
differentiation is relatively more important, although this question is beyond our present scope. 
  Note also that the ethnic-network elasticities for these five countries are much larger than 
has been found in any previous estimation.  For all five, the absolute value of their ethnic-
network elasticities are more than four times the common ethnic-network elasticity we reported 
in Table 3.  Oddly, though, these results also suggest that for Colombia the ethnic-network 
  12elasticity is negative and very large: A 10-percent increase in the number of residents born in 
Colombia should decrease exports to Colombia by 5.8%.
17  Nevertheless, this version of the 
model and the results it provides are preferred statistically to all other versions up to this point. 
  We should caution that our results do not rule out the possibility that ethnic networks are 
important for countries other than these five.  In fact, there are a number of countries with large 
point estimates for their ethnic-network elasticities, such as Ireland and the United Kingdom, that 
are not statistically significant.  With more years of data there might be a longer list of countries 
whose ethnic-network elasticity is statistically significant.  Nevertheless, our point is that when 
you allow for the effects of ethnic network effects to differ, you find that the effects are not 
present for all countries and are much larger than when you restrict them to be the same across 
countries. 
  Our fairly large data set, which has nearly fifteen hundred observations for each of two 
years, has allowed us to remove two sets of restrictions from the standard gravity model, both of 
which are not supported statistically or by theory.  It also allows us to remove even more 
restrictions that might be biasing our above results.  In particular, because we have at least 94 
observations for each country, we can estimate separate country-specific gravity models, thereby 
allowing the coefficients on the gravity variables to differ across countries.  After all, in the 
theoretical gravity model of Bergstrand (1989), it is perfectly reasonable to expect not only 
different magnitudes on the coefficient on the population variable but also different signs.  If 
larger states (countries) are more self-sufficient, then population is related negatively to exports.  
On the other hand, larger populations might promote a division of labor that increases trade 
opportunities for a variety of goods.  As a result, a model requiring identical coefficients for state 
exports to various countries might not be appropriate for some countries.  In other words, our 
                                                 
17 Additional discussion of the results for Columbia is provided later in the paper. 
  13estimates might be biased by the restrictions that the signs on the gravity variables are the same 
across countries. 
  We estimate separately for each country the following fixed-effects gravity model: 















ij F N N Y Y x ε + θ + γ + β + τ + σ =   (5) 
The results of our estimations are summarized in Table 5.  The first thing to notice is the 
significant difference in the performance of the gravity model in explaining state exports, as 
evidenced by the large differences in the magnitudes of the coefficients on the gravity variables, 
the differences in R
2s, and in the results of F-tests.  In fact, for South Africa and Sweden an F-
test fails to reject the null hypothesis that the model has no explanatory power. 
For our purposes, the importance of allowing for country-specific gravity models is to see 
how it affects the estimates of the countries’ ethnic-network elasticities.  For these results, there 
are five countries whose estimated ethnic-network elasticities are statistically different from 
zero:  Brazil, Canada, Italy, Spain, and Turkey.  The elasticities for Spain and Turkey are the 
largest: A 10% increase in the number of foreign residents from Spain or Turkey should increase 
exports to the respective country by about 11%.  For the other three countries, the elasticities are 
much larger than has been reported in the literature and range from 0.4 to 0.8     
Note that the set of countries is different compared to our previous results:  While both 
models indicate that ethnic networks are important for exports to Brazil, Spain, and Turkey; 
Colombia and Thailand have been replaced by Canada and Italy.  In obtaining the first set of 
country-specific results, we were injecting bias for Colombia, Thailand, Canada, and Italy 
because of our assumption that the coefficients on the gravity variables were the same across 
countries.  This is readily seen by comparing the results in Table 4, for which gravity model was 
  14assumed to be the same across countries, to those in Table 5, for which each country is allowed 
to have its own gravity equation.   
For example, Colombia’s earlier, peculiar result that its ethnic-network effect is negative 
arose because the gravity model for Colombia is extremely idiosyncratic: alone among the 29 
countries, and counter to all theory regarding gravity models, the coefficient on its income 
variable is very negative and is statistically significant.  In addition, the coefficient on 
Colombia’s population variable is more than 17 times the common coefficient from Table 4.  As 
a consequence of Colombia’s idiosyncratic gravity model, the earlier estimate of its negative 
ethnic-network effect disappears when the restriction on Colombia’s gravity equation is relaxed.  
Similarly, for Thailand, Canada, and Italy, the differences between their country-specific gravity 
equation and the common gravity equation account for the different estimates in their ethnic-
network elasticities between Tables 4 and 5. 
 
6. Conclusion 
  Our estimation of various gravity models shows very clearly that the estimates of ethnic-
network elasticities are sensitive to the restrictions imposed on the models.  When we removed 
the restriction that the intercepts are the same for all country pairs, we found a smaller network 
effect than we did with the restricted model.  When we allowed network effects do differ across 
countries, we found statistically significant network effects for only five of the 29 countries in 
our sample.  Finally, when we allowed for country-specific gravity models, we found statistically 
significant and network effects for a different set of five countries.   
  Prior research examining the relationship between immigrants and international trade has 
tended to estimate a single ethnic-network elasticity for trade flowing from one country to a 
  15group of countries.  Our main finding is that, in doing so, prior research has masked a great deal 
of heterogeneity in the effects of network effects on trade.  In unmasking this heterogeneity, our 
bottom line is that ethnic-network elasticities are actually much more important than has been 
reported previously, but that they are most important for a subset of countries.  Of course, 
unmasking the heterogeneity at the country level leaves for future research the identification of 
the reasons for the differences across countries.  At this point we have pointed to some research 
that provides potential reasons for our results. 
We must stress, however, that we are not arguing that immigrant networks are 
unimportant for exports to countries in which we do not find statistical significance.  Our 
analysis relies on the standard proxy for immigrant networks that is based on the number of 
immigrants in a state.  This proxy is undoubtedly less than ideal and may be seriously flawed as 
a measure of networks for some countries.  Networks are not necessarily larger for each new 
immigrant, but rather depend on the skills of the immigrants, which might not be accurately 
gauged by the quantity of immigrants.
18
 
                                                 
18 In their study of Canadian exports, Head and Ries (1998) found that immigrants classified as independents 
(mostly professionals) affected trade relatively more than entrepreneurs and refugees. 
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  18Table 1. Summary of Empirical Papers 
  Data Econometrics  Ethnic-network 
elasticity of exports 
Ethnic-network 
elasticity of imports
Gould (1994)  US aggregate trade, 1970-
86, 47 countries  Not a gravity model  0.02  0.01 
Head and Ries 
(1998) 
Canadian aggregate trade, 
1980-92, 136 countries  Simple PCS  0.10  0.31 
Dunlevy and 
Hutchinson (1999) 
US aggregate and 
disaggregated trade 1870-
1910, 17 countries 
Simple PCS  0.08  0.29 
Rauch and Trindade 
(2002) 
aggregate and 
disaggretated, 63 and 160 
countries, respectively 




Girma and Yu 
(2002)  
UK aggregated trade, 
1981-93, 48 countries 
Simple PCS, effect of 







Wagner, Head, and 
Ries (2002) 
Canadian provinces, 
1992-95, 160 countries 
PCS with country 
dummies  0.013 0.092 
Co, Euzent, and 
Martin (2004) 
US state exports, 1993, 28 
countries  Simple PCS 
0.27 – 0.30 
0.27 low income 




US state exports, 1994-
96, 51 countries 
Simple PCS, east 
coast vs. west coast. 
0.24 - 0.26 W 
0.06 - 0.09 E   
Herander and 
Saavedra (2005) 
US state exports, 1993-
96, 36 countries 





Dunlevy (2006)  US state exports, 1990-92 
average, 87 countries 
PCS with state and 
country dummies. 
0.24 – 0.47 
   
Bryant, Genç, and 
Law (2004) 
New Zealand aggregate 
trade, 1981-2001, 170+ 
countries 
Random effects  0.05 (all goods) 
0.10 (exc. ag) 
0.19 (all goods) 
0.23 (exc. oil) 
Mundra (2005) 
US aggregate trade, 
intermediate and finished 




variable in a panel 
Not estimated, 
network effect for 
finished goods, but 





Notes: PCS = pooled cross section.  Unless otherwise noted, all papers use a gravity model.  Some of the elasticity 
calculations are from Wagner, Head, and Ries (2002). 
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Table 2. Pooled Cross-Section with Common Network Effect 
 
No Network Effect 
( )  0   and   = θ α = α j ij
Common Network Effect 
( )  θ = θ α = α j ij   and  
 Coeff.  S.E. t-stat. Coeff.  S.E. t-stat. 
Intercept (α) -15.315*  5.690 -2.69  -13.969 5.597  -2.50   
State and country dummies  yes    yes       
Time/policy dummies (τj) yes   yes       
ln YiYj (β) 0.700*  0.346 2.02  0.638†  0.341 1.87   
ln NiNj (γ)  0.863†  0.523 1.65  0.606 0.515  1.18   
ln Distij (δ) -1.310*  0.093 -14.10  -1.076* 0.094  -11.40   
Contigij (η) 0.640*  0.183 3.49  0.243 0.185  1.31   
ln Fij (θ)        -          0.266*  0.027  9.79  
Log-likelihood -3719.90  -3670.85 
F-statistic  F(61, 2800) = 103.95  F(62, 2799) = 107.29 
2 R   0.787 0.781 
Statistical significance at the 10 and 5% levels are indicated by “†” and “*”, respectively.  Each 





Table 3. Fixed-Effects Model with  
Common Network Effect 
 
Common Network Effect 
( )  θ = θ   j
 Coeff.  S.E. t-stat.
Pair-specific intercept (αij) yes       
Time/policy dummies (τj) yes       
ln YiYj (β) 1.001*  0.151 6.62 
ln NiNj (γ)  0.461 0.348 1.33 
ln Fij (θ) 0.142*  0.063 2.26 
Log-likelihood -1785.87 
F-statistic F(31,1425)  =  26.91 
2 R (within) 0.369 
Statistical significance at the 10 and 5% levels are indicated by 
“†” and “*”, respectively.  The regression uses 2912 observations 
and has 1456 state/country pairs. 
 
  20Table 4. Country-Specific Networks 
 
Country Network Effects 
( )  ed unrestrict   j θ
 Coeff.  S.E. t-stat.
Pair-specific intercept (αij)y e s  
Time/policy dummies (τj)y e s       
ln YiYj (β) 0.768*  0.256 3.00
ln NiNj (γ)  0.601 0.390 1.54
ln Fij (θj)        
Argentina 0.366  0.282 1.30
Australia -0.212  0.426 -0.50
Brazil 0.603*  0.291 2.07
Canada 0.231  0.536 0.43
Chile 0.016  0.226 0.07
China 0.208  0.448 0.46
Colombia -0.581†  0.315 -1.84
Egypt -0.302  0.314 -0.96
France 0.121  0.504 0.24
Germany 0.184  0.734 0.25
Hong Kong  0.134  0.334 0.40
India 0.068  0.382 0.18
Indonesia 0.258  0.260 0.99
Ireland 0.650  0.449 1.45
Israel 0.118  0.223 0.53
Italy 0.367  0.492 0.75
Japan 0.140  0.604 0.23
Malaysia 0.204  0.196 1.04
Mexico -0.081  0.204 -0.39
Netherlands 0.293  0.467 0.63
Philippines -0.399  0.514 -0.78
South Africa  -0.221  0.310 -0.71
South Korea  -0.186  0.510 -0.36
Spain 0.913*  0.373 2.44
Sweden 0.024  0.259 0.09
Thailand 0.665†  0.378 1.76
Turkey 1.090*  0.305 3.58
United Kingdom  0.622  0.711 0.88
Venezuela -0.179  0.246 -0.73
Log-likelihood -1746.21 
F-statistic F(60,1396)  =  14.64 
2 R (within) 0.386 
Statistical significance at the 10 and 5% levels are indicated by 
“†” and “*”, respectively.  The regression uses 2912 
observations and has 1456 state/country pairs. 
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Table 5. Country-Specific Gravity Models 
 Time  dummy  ln YiYj Ln NiNj ln Fij  










2 R  
(within) n 
Argentina  0.266    1.059  0.151 1.325 3.297 2.039 0.199 0.292 32.42  0.738  100 
Australia  0.303    0.268  1.599 0.987 -2.057 1.520 -0.071 0.342 2.99  0.203  102 
Brazil  0.411    0.480  1.936 1.497 -2.031 2.182 0.600† 0.334 12.66 0.524  100 
Canada  0.311*  0.112  0.169 0.447 0.585 0.700 0.404† 0.212 48.06 0.804  102 
Chile  0.692    0.918 -0.897 1.264 2.659 1.847 0.045 0.218 6.98  0.378  100 
China -2.736†  1.605  3.893* 1.656 -3.655 2.407 -0.096 0.584 17.31  0.596  102 
Colombia 2.425*  0.848  -5.628*  1.549 10.238* 2.238 -0.258  0.394 12.88  0.523  102 
Egypt  -1.226    1.648  3.578 2.710 -4.061 3.346 -0.344 0.388 4.56  0.293  96 
France 0.170    0.157  1.111  0.710 -1.852†  1.109 0.363 0.292 5.34  0.313  102 
Germany  0.054    0.154  0.454 0.606 -0.061 1.040 0.465 0.405 5.27  0.310  102 
Hong  Kong  -1.475*  0.735  2.302*  1.113 0.290 1.827 -0.086 0.346 10.76  0.483  100 
India  -0.146    0.560  2.578 1.960 -2.003 2.416 -0.099 0.636 2.20  0.161  100 
Indonesia  -0.219    0.563 -0.643 2.327 3.326 3.134 0.178 0.335 3.34  0.229  98 
Ireland -2.124†  1.087  3.240* 1.586 0.931 2.531 0.390 0.582 12.17  0.514  100 
Israel  -0.623    0.863 -0.698 1.448 4.744* 2.351 -0.064 0.275 8.91  0.431  102 
Italy -0.036  0.213  4.153* 1.082 -5.257*  1.780 0.796† 0.458 4.23 0.265  102 
Japan -0.481†  0.275 1.367† 0.772 -0.772 1.121 0.180 0.389 2.12  0.153  102 
Malaysia -0.262    0.877  -0.906  1.780 5.682† 2.921 -0.065 0.292 14.65  0.560  100 
Mexico 1.728*  0.632  -2.252*  1.142 3.827* 1.627 0.125  0.180 29.55  0.729  96 
Netherlands  -0.141    0.289  0.479 0.925 1.109 1.476 0.265 0.358 3.89  0.249  102 
Philippines  -0.216    0.640  0.457 1.416 3.902 2.677 -1.240 0.859 8.32  0.420  100 
South  Africa  0.041    0.537 -0.009 1.242 1.110 1.974 -0.177 0.321 1.56  0.122  98 
South  Korea  0.579    0.727 -0.152 1.354 0.242 2.036 -0.021 0.543 3.88  0.248  102 
Spain  -0.025    0.331 -0.620 1.441 0.300 2.137 1.107* 0.423 2.09  0.151  102 
Sweden  -0.146    0.258  1.253 1.337 0.081 2.151 0.059 0.282 0.71  0.057  102 
Thailand  0.302    0.564 -0.325 1.546 0.862 2.415 0.706 0.467 5.48  0.318  102 
Turkey  -0.599    0.776  1.369 2.324 0.647 3.529 1.067* 0.512 4.86  0.311  94 
United Kingdom  -0.507   0.376  1.606† 0.917 -0.782 1.482 0.691 0.653 5.34  0.312  102 
Venezuela -1.375†  0.760  2.653*  1.207 -1.495 1.771 -0.314 0.231 4.33  0.273  100 
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